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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A jury found Brandon Laursen guilty of two counts of vehicular burglary and the 
district court withheld judgment. Mr. Laursen asserts that his due process right to 
present a defense was violated by the district court's order precluding him from 
testifying about his mental condition when the crimes allegedly occurred. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Brandon Laursen with two counts of burglary, allegedly 
committed by entering two vehicles with the intent to commit the crime of theft. 
(R., pp.37-38.) Prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Laursen submitted a proposed jury 
instruction informing the jury that a defendant cannot be found guilty if they are 
unconscious of committing the criminal act. (R., p.59.) During voir dire, and over 
objection from the prosecutor, counsel for Mr. Laursen explored the topic of observing 
people who suffer from anxiety disorder or Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (hereinafter, 
PTSD) with prospective jurors. (Tr. Vair Dire, p.31, L.24 - p.33, L.12.) 
After the jury had been selected, the prosecutor moved to "exclude any reference 
to the defendant having or not having PTSD," arguing that Mr. Laursen could not 
establish that he suffers from PTSD by his own testimony and that the evidence would 
not be relevant; further, the prosecutor moved to exclude any evidence that Mr. Laursen 
served in the military overseas. (Tr. Trial, p.26, L.21 - p.28, L.6.) Counsel for 
Mr. Laursen responded by arguing that, if he testifies, Mr. Laursen should be allowed to 
testify about his own state of mind and the experiences that affected his state of mind, 
as those factors are relevant to the intent element and objected to the court excluding 
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such evidence. (Tr. Trial, p.28, L.8 - p.29, L.22.) The prosecutor again argued that 
Mr. Laursen would have to present expert testimony on the subject of how his own past 
experiences affected how he was feeling on the day of the alleged crimes. (Tr. Trial, 
p.29, L.24 - p.30, L.5.) The district court granted the State's motion to exclude any 
reference to Mr. Laursen's service overseas and any diagnosis of PTSD reasoning that 
it would be hearsay; furthermore, the court found that the evidence would not be 
relevant to the unconscious act defense the court believed Mr. Laursen was raising. 
(Tr. Trial, p.30, L.6 - p.31, L.14.) 
Defense counsel asked the court if Mr. Laursen would be able to testify about his 
own mental state on the night in question, and the district court initially stated that he 
would. (Tr. Trial, p.31, Ls.15-18.) However, when defense counsel asked whether 
Mr. Laursen would be able to explain why he had that mental state, even if it had 
something to do with his military experience, the court required an offer of proof. 
(Tr. Trial, p.31, Ls.19-25.) Defense counsel offered that Mr. Laursen would testify about 
his war experiences and that they have led to anxiety, flashbacks, and other symptoms 
of PTSD, and suggested that Mr. Laursen could present his testimony without 
mentioning his specific PTSD diagnosis. (Tr. Trial, p.32, Ls.1-25.) Defense counsel 
stated that the evidence was not related to the possibility of instructing the jury on the 
unconscious act defense; rather, the evidence was relevant to the "intent element of 
burglary." (Tr. Trial, p.33, Ls.3-7.) 
The prosecutor again objected arguing that it was a "thinly-veiled attempt to get 
this evidence before the jury to play upon their passions" and that the evidence is not 
relevant. (Tr. Trial, p.33, L.11 - p.34, L.2.) The court again focused on the proposed, 
unconscious act jury instruction and asked for a second offer of proof. (Tr. Trial, p.34, 
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Ls.3-10.) Defense counsel again focused on the State's burden to prove specific intent, 
and asserted that Mr. Laursen's war experiences, including being injured in combat, 
"affected his mental state that night," and such evidence is relevant to the intent issue. 
(Tr. Trial, p.34, L.11 - p.35, L.5.) 
The district court stated that its ruling would not change, and again focused on its 
belief that Mr. Laursen was offering the evidence in support of an unconscious act 
defense. (Tr. Trial, p.35, L.6 - p.36, L.3.) 
Defense counsel then stated, 
I would move to withdraw that jury instruction. I think it's confused 
the issue in this case because I even without the jury instruction, intent 
is the burden of the State, and I think his mental state of mind that night is 
a hundred percent relevant to intent which is the State's burden, so to 
simplify it I'll move to withdraw that instruction, and I still stand on 
everything previously mentioned about wanting to introduce evidence 
about his mental state and why he had a mental - that particular mental 
state that night. 
(Tr. Trial, p.36, Ls.7-16.) The district court ruled as follows, 
Okay. Well, and even if the instruction was requested and still 
potentially at issue, my ruling wouldn't change. If - I guess there's an 
additional reason. If your client were to exercise his right not to testify, 
then the only way that this would come in is through a cryptic reference on 
a booking sheet, and now in addition to being hearsay and not relevant, 
the conclusion that you would want to have that go toward the issue of a 
lack of intent, not the affirmative defense listed in 1507, but just the State's 
burden of proving intent is speculative. You'd be making an argument 
without any basis in fact or science, and I can't allow that to happen, so 
the ruling remains the same. 
(Tr. Trial, p.36, L.17 - p.37, L.5.) 
The State presented evidence that in August of 2012, two Coeur d'Alene police 
officers were called out at 6:40 a.m. to investigate a suspicious male who was "knocking 
on a lady's window." (Tr. Trial, p. 78, L.18 - p.80, L.3; p.103, L.21 - p.104, L.22.) The 
officers made contact with Brandon Laursen who had miscellaneous items in a white 
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trash bag, including his military identification. (Tr. Trial, p.80, L.2 - p.83, L.5, p.104, 
L.23 - p.105, L.20.) Also included in the trash bag were items belonging to two people 
who lived in the area, Brandon Richards and Jennifer Cruz, both of whom testified that 
they had last seen those items in their vehicles including a prescription bottle belonging 
to Mr. Richards, and that they did not know Mr. Laursen. (Tr. Trial, p.47, L.1 - p.78, 
L.7.) 
Robin Hughes, the person who called the police, testified that outside her 
apartment window she heard a very animated and energetic Mr. Laursen talking loudly 
into a cell phone, although she did not know whether the phone was on or not. 
(Tr. Trial, p.231, L.14 - p.233, L.10.) She testified that "there was no continuum of 
ideas" in his cell phone conversation. (Tr. Trial, p.239, Ls.22-24.) Ms. Hughes asked 
Mr. Laursen what he was doing, and he told her that he was an undercover cop trying to 
get in touch with his partner and he showed her his identification, although he did not 
have a badge. (Tr. Trial, p.233, L.11 - p.234, L.24.) Ms. Hughes walked outside and 
saw Mr. Laursen going through three plastic grocery bags (not a white plastic trash 
bag), he walked around the corner "talking very loudly and quite animatedly to himself" 
when he saw her, and Ms. Hughes looked through the bags. (Tr. Trial, p.234, L.25 -
p.236, L.16; p.242, L.20 - p.243, L.23.) When she went back inside and called 911, 
Ms. Hughes observed Mr. Laursen pick up the three bags and, as he was walking away 
from the apartment building, items spilled from the bags despite his attempts to control 
them. (Tr. Trial, p.243, L.24 - p.247, L.18.) 
Mr. Laursen took the stand on his own behalf and testified, inter alia, as follows: 
that on the day before he was arrested, he was carrying his belongings in one grocery 
bag and some of Heidi, his girlfriend's, belongings in another; that he had been drinking 
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the night before and had met a person named Brandon Williams, and gone to his house 
with other people in the early morning hours, and that he later left to try and find his 
girlfriend's apartment; that he had only known Heidi for a short time and that he could 
not find her apartment; that he was somewhat intoxicated and that there are glitches in 
his memory; that one of the plastic bags broke and he picked up a white trash bag 
behind a dumpster and placed the contents of the grocery bag into the trash bag; that 
he believed some of the items found by police in the white trash bag were in there 
before he transferred his belongings to that bag; that he expected the police would 
arrive after he made contact with Robin Hughes; that he told the officers that he 
believed he had picked up a prescription bottle belonging to his friend Brandon by 
accident when asked why he had Mr. Richard's prescription bottle; that he told 
Ms. Hughes that he was a police sergeant because he was in the military police, and he 
showed her his military identification; and, that he did not break into any cars. (Tr. Trial, 
p.126 L.8 - p.178, L.8, p.223, L.13 - p.230, L.24.) 
The jury found Mr. Laursen guilty of both charges of vehicular burglary. 
(R., p.105.) Noting that Mr. Laursen had done well in his military service but has 
struggled since he has been out of the service, the district court withheld judgment and 
placed him on probation requiring, among other things, that Mr. Laursen continue with 
treatment for his PTSD and this traumatic brain injury. 1 (Tr. Sentencing.) Mr. Laursen 
timely appealed from the district court's Sentencing Disposition and Notice of Right to 
Appeal. (R., pp.110-118.) 
1 Mr. Laursen joined the U.S. Army at the age of 17, served 4 tours of duty in Iraq, 
suffered from PTSD since 2007, and suffered injuries to his head and lower leg as a 




Did the district court violate Mr. Laursen's due process right to present a defense when 
the court declared that Mr. Laursen would not be able to testify that he suffers from 
anxiety and flashbacks as a result of his military service? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Violated Mr. Laursen's Due Process Right To Present A Defense 
When The Court Declared That Mr. Laursen Would Not Be Able To Testify That He 
Suffers From Anxiety And Flashbacks As A Result Of His Military Service 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Laursen's counsel offered that Mr. Laursen would testify that he was 
suffering from anxiety and flashbacks, which resulted from his military service, on the 
night of his alleged crimes. The testimony was relevant to the charge crimes and would 
not have been based upon any inadmissible hearsay. The district court denied 
Mr. Laursen his due process right to present his defense and to testify on his own behalf 
by denying Mr. Lausen the ability to present the above testimony. Furthermore, 
Mr. Laursen asserts that the State will be unable to prove that the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. Relevant Jurisprudence 
A criminal defendant has the right to testify on his or her own behalf. Rock v. 
Arkansas, 486 U.S. 44, 49 (1987). This right is founded in the compulsory process 
clause of the Sixth Amendment, is a corollary to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
against compelled testimony, and is protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 49-53. "A defendant's opportunity to conduct his own 
defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness." 
Id. at 52. A state "may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the 
stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony." Id. at 55. 
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
lower court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 
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584, 590 (1984) (quoting White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).) Furthermore, '"A 
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, 
(2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal 
standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."' Id. (quoting 
Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 594 (2011 ).) 
'"Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R 401. Relevant 
evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of Evidence, while 
evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. I.RE. 402. Whether evidence is 
relevant is a question of law that is freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 
228 (2008). 
Witnesses are presumed to be competent. I.RE. 601. "A witness may not testify 
to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness 
has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but 
need not, consist of the testimony of the witness." I.RE. 602. '"Hearsay' is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted," and is generally not 
admissible unless an exception applies. I.RE. 801, 802. "A statement of the 
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such 
as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including 
a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed ... " is not 
excluded by the hearsay rule. I.RE. 803(3). 
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Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 
(2010). "To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence 
complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 
(1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Precluding Mr. Laursen From 
Testifying About His Mental State At The Time Of His Alleged Crimes, Resulting 
In A Violation Of Mr. Laursen's Right To Due Process Of Law 
Counsel for Mr. Laursen proffered that he would testify that he suffers from 
anxiety and flashbacks resulting from his military service, that he would do so without 
mentioning a diagnosis of PTSD, and that the testimony was relevant to the intent 
element. (Tr. Trial, p.28, L.8 - p.29, L.22; p.32, L.1 - p.33, L.7; p.34, L.11 - p.35, L.5; 
p.36, Ls.7-16.) The district court granted the State's motion to exclude (in effect also 
denying defense counsel's objection to the State's motion to exclude), finding that such 
testimony would be both hearsay and irrelevant.2 (Tr. Trial, p.30, L.6 - p.31, L.14; p.36, 
L.17 - p.37, L.5.) The district court abused its discretion by acting outside the bounds 
its discretion, by failing to correctly apply the applicable legal standards, and by failing to 
exercise reason. 
2 The Court also concluded that, if Mr. Laursen did not testify, the only evidence in 
support of his condition would come would be "through a cryptic reference on a booking 
sheet." (Tr. Trial, p.36, L.17 - p.37, L.5.) Mr. Laursen does not assert that the court 
erred in holding that the evidence could not come in unless he testified; however, this 
portion of the court's holding is irrelevant as defense counsel proffered only that the 
evidence would come in through Mr. Laursen's own testimony. 
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Mr. Laursen was a competent witness testifying about matters within his personal 
knowledge. See I.RE. 601, 602. His proffered testimony was about his own 
experiences and his own mental condition on the night of the alleged vehicular 
burglaries. The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Laursen entered the two vehicles in question with the specific intent to commit the 
crime of theft. (R, pp.37-38 (Information); R, pp.92-93 (Jury Instructions on elements 
of Burglary); I.C. § 18-1401 (Burglary defined).) Therefore, his testimony had a 
"tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence," and 
was relevant and admissible. I.RE. 401, 402. 
Furthermore, his proffered testimony was not "hearsay" as it was not an out-of-
court statement; rather, his testimony would have been presented in front of the jury and 
subject to cross-examination. I.RE. 801; see also Rock at 52 (stating, "Like the 
truthfulness of other witnesses, the defendant's veracity ... can be tested adequately by 
cross examination.") Even if he had proffered statements he made out-of-court 
regarding his mental condition at the time of the alleged offense through another 
witness, and even if he chose not to testify, such statements would not be excludible 
under the hearsay rule. See I.RE. 803(3). 
Thus, Mr. Laursen's testimony was neither hearsay nor irrelevant, and there was 
simply no basis under the Idaho Rules of Evidence to exclude such testimony. Thus, 
the district court denied Mr. Laursen his constitutional right to present his defense. See 
generally Rock, supra. As such, the district court abused its discretion by excluding 
Mr. Laursen's testimony on these matters. 
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D. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Is Harmless 
Counsel for Mr. Laursen objected to the district court excluding his proffered 
testimony. As such, if this Court finds that the district court erred it this ruling, the State 
bears the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error was harmless under 
the standards articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The State will not be able to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Mr. Laursen had the specific intent to commit the crime of theft upon entering the cars, 
had the jury heard testimony that Mr. Laursen suffers from anxiety attacks and 
flashbacks as a result of his military history. 
Alternatively, the State will not be able to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the jury would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Laursen even entered 
into the vehicles in the first place. Had the jury been made aware that Mr. Laursen 
suffers from anxiety attacks and flashbacks, his peculiar interactions with Ms. Hughes 
would have had an explanation, and his testimony about picking up a random trash bag 
and adding his own items to the contents of that bag would have been more believable. 
At the very least, the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Laursen's 
explanation would have still not been believed by the jurors who heard his case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Laursen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
withholding judgment and remand the case to the district court for a new trial. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2013. 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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